Balancing Performance Measures When Agents Behave Competitively in an Environment With Technological Interdependencies by Sandner, Kai
 
 
 
Balancing performance measures when agents behave 
competitively in an environment with technological 
interdependencies 
 
 
Kai Sandner 
 
 
Discussion Paper 2008 – 2 
Febuary 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LMU 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Munich School of Management 
 
 
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/ 
Balancing performance measures when agents behave
competitively in an environment with technological
interdependencies
Keywords: Social Preferences, Rivalry, Technological Interdependencies, Performance
Measurement, Team Composition
JEL Classification: D23, D82, D86, M41, M52
Overview
• Technological interdependencies are a major characteristic in many decentralized
firms. They represent situations, where agents are supposed to work together or
where production externalities impose consequences of own efforts on other division
results.
• Previous studies in agency theory have examined incentive compatible wage com-
pensation systems in the presence of technological interdependencies focusing on the
conflict between cooperation and competition. They rely on the assumption of pure
egoism.
• Recently, experimentalists, psychologists and others have shown, that this assumpti-
on does not hold under all circumstances. Instead, social preferences are often also of
concern. This particularly applies to work environments where agents are expected
to work together due to technological interdependencies.
• This study enriches a principal-multi-agent model with technological and stochastic
interdependencies by a generalized utility conception. We focus on competitive prefe-
rences and examine how the weighting and the combination of performance measures
are affected.
• We find that the principal reacts to his agents’ rivalry through a reallocation of in-
centive intensity. Thus, various differences in the balancing of performance measures
arise. We further show that the principal does not want both of his agents to behave
equally competitively. Instead, he can only profit when the agents are asymmetrical.
Then the principal wants the more productive agent to exhibit rivalry while the other
ideally should behave completely egoistically.
1 Motivation
This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance eva-
luation and in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence of
technological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rival-
ry.1 It is further examined, whether the principal can exploit his managers’ striving for
personal advancement to further his own merits and how these results depend on the
underlying work environment.
Technological interdependencies are a constitutive element in many decentralized com-
panies. Increasing complexity of technological processes, time pressure and rising customer
demands on the one side as well as the need for specialized know-how on the other cause
numerous mutual intra-firm dependencies, making cooperation between employees an in-
dispensable success factor. Thus, teamwork has received increasing attention over the last
few years. At the same time monetary incentives are considered to be of crucial import-
ance as an instrument of employee motivation in order to guarantee for goal congruent
behavior.2 Therefore, many firms nowadays employ contracts using performance-related
components as an effort enhancing device. In particular, piece rates, where agents partici-
pate in certain performance indicators have received growing attention. However, if only
individual division results were used as performance measures, this would enhance depart-
mental self-interests and therefore contradict the necessity of trans-divisional cooperation.
Thus, a positive combination of individual metrics called team based compensation can
prove to be superior. A major drawback is the agents’ higher exposure to risk, mainly if
their division results are affected by common factors outside of the firm like the overall
business cycle. In this case a negative combination of performance measures called relative
performance evaluation3 may be advantageous.4
The principal’s decision of whether to induce cooperation or competition does not
depend on these external factors alone. Incentives have the purpose of affecting people’s
efforts. Therefore they need to take their receivers’ diverse motivations into account in
order to be effective. Teamwork due to technological interdependencies makes the social
component of human interaction come to the fore since employees mutually affect their
division results and usually work closely together for longer periods so that they are able
to control and compare themselves with each other. Recently, it has been substantiated by
experimental econometricians5, psychologists and neuro scientists6, that social preferences
primarily determine behavior in such personal face-to-face interactions, that occur on a
regular basis,7 where no complete contracts can be written to govern people’s actions.8
Most notably, rivalry9 seems to be of high practical relevance as can be seen from the
current discussion on wage justice in Germany. Furthermore, the secrecy of remuneration
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and its composition in many industrial enterprises indicates, that the executive board fears
counterproductive effects, if agents have the opportunity to compare their compensation.
Our paper shifts the discussion on the field of
”
Behavioral Contract Theory“ towards
an accounting perspective of how to balance performance measures in a situation with
heterogeneous competitive agents under various circumstances. As we will show below,
the principal reacts to his agents’ social preferences with a reallocation of incentive in-
tensity through adjusting the relative weight of performance measures in their respective
wage compensation systems. Depending on the established trade-off between the oppo-
sing external effects as well as the comparative strength of rivalry, changes in the decision
between cooperation and competition inducing incentive systems can occur. This paper’s
main contribution is to provide a thorough understanding of the underlying interactions
of the considered types of interdependencies with their motivational consequences. Buil-
ding on these results, we establish, that the principal profits from his agents’ competitive
preferences, if only the higher productive agent exhibits rivalry while the other behaves
preferably egoistically. This result holds independent of the underlying production tech-
nology, as long as separate performance measures for each of the agents are available.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
related literature. Section 3 describes the model with its basic assumptions. Sections 4, 5
and 6 present the main results of our theoretical analysis. The impacts of rivalry on the
weighting and the combination of performance measures are separately discussed for two
forms of technological interdependencies. Section 4 considers a situation with productive
interaction, in section 5 the case of a production externality is examined. Finally, the
impacts of rivalry on firm profitability are considered in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Previous papers in the field of
”
Behavioral Contract Theory“ have broadly studied the
single-agent case where one agent compares himself to the principal.10 In addition to that,
horizontally directed social preferences have been incorporated in principal-multi-agent
models. Rey Biel (2007) examines the impact of inequity aversion11 under the assump-
tion of complete certainty and finds, that in case of team production social comparisons
between agents have an intrinsic motivation effect. Itoh (2004) confirms these results in
a situation of uncertainty and generalizes them to the case of competitive preferences.
Additionally, he compares team based compensation and relative performance evaluation
in dependence of the degree of uncertainty as well as the agents’ personnel characteristics.
However, he does not allow for asymmetries between the agents and neglects technologi-
cal dependencies. Both authors rely on the assumption of limited liability. In contrast to
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their results, Bartling/von Siemens (2005) show, that the principal cannot make use of his
agents’ inequity aversion, if the limited liability constraints are not imposed. They further
prove that the
”
Sufficient Statistics Result“12 loses validity when the agents exhibit social
preferences, since the principal then tends to provide more equal forms of remuneration.13
Similar results under the assumption of linear incentive contracts are achieved by Dier-
kes/Harreiter (2006) and Neilson/Stowe (2008).14 In contrast to these studies we take an
accounting perspective and focus on the balancing of performance measures in presence
of social preferences. In particular we examine how the trade-off between team based pay-
ment and relative performance evaluation is influenced by two-sided rivalry in a situation
of technological and stochastic interdependencies. This is distinguishable from the case of
team production in the sense of Alchian/Demsetz (1972), which was previously considered
by Rob/Zemsky (2002), Bartling/von Siemens (2004) and Huck/Ku¨bler/Weibull (2006).
3 Model description
For our theoretical analysis we employ a principal-multi-agent LEN model15 with tech-
nological interdependencies as introduced by Itoh (1992) as well as Choi (1993) and enrich
their specifications by a generalized utility conception accounting for social preferences
between agents on the same horizontal layer. We consider two agents denoted by A and
B, each of whom is responsible for the profits of the decentralized unit he is presiding. Let
x1 be the performance metric of agent A and x2 be that of agent B.
16 Each of the perfor-
mance measures is linear contingent on the agents’ actions ai , bi as well as an additively
linked error term 1 and 2. The error terms are assumed to be normally distributed with
zero mean and variance σ2i . Their correlation is denoted by %. By means of the underlying
production technology, two cases of technological interdependencies are differentiated in
the subsequent analysis: (1) The first production technology of the form
x1 = pA1a1 + pB1b1 + 1 ; x2 = pA2a2 + pB2b2 + 2, (1)
describes a situation where each of the agents cannot only influence his own performance
measure but also, through specific actions, the one of the respective other agent. The
effort parameters a2 and b1 denote those actions of agent A (B) that precipitate in agent
B’s (A’s) division result. Positive values are interpreted as help, negative values as sa-
botage. The parameters pA1 and pA2 as well as pB1 and pB2 in equation 1 reflect differential
productivities of the two agents with respect to their various activities. (2) The second
production technology has the form
x1 = a1 + pB1b2 + 1 ; x2 = b2 + pA2a1 + 2, (2)
and represents a situation, in which both agents’ effort choices not only contribute to their
own margins but are also automatically reflected in the division profits of the respective
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other. The parameters pB1 and pA2 in equation 2 are measures for the strength of the
production externality between the two decentralized divisions and are restricted to lie
in the interval pB1 , pA2 ∈ [0, 1]. For the sake of semantical clearness, the subsequent
analysis refers to the production technology in equation 2 as production technology with
a production externality. The wording production technology with productive interaction
however identifies a production technology of the type given in equation 1.
Further differentiation is possible with respect to the values of parameter %. For % = 0
the production technology is called stochastically independent while for % 6= 0 the two
divisions are also interrelated through stochastic interdependencies. In the latter case,
the absolute value of the correlation coefficient % is a measure for the strength of the
stochastic interdependencies and restricted to lie in the interval % ∈ [0; 1].17 For the sake
of generality, we assume % > 0 throughout our analysis.
Effort costs are assumed to be quadratic in the agents’ actions and modeled by the
use of the general function
VA(a1,a2) =
1
2
cA1a
2
1 +
1
2
cA2a
2
2 ; VB(b1,b2) =
1
2
cB1b
2
1 +
1
2
cB2b
2
2, (3)
which, in the case of the production technology in equation 2 reduces to:
VA(a1) =
1
2
cA1a
2
1 ; VB(b2) =
1
2
cB2b
2
2. (4)
The parameters cA1 , cA2 , cB1 , cB2 are again weighting factors, describing task specific
differences in the strength of perceived disutility. Both agents are compensated by a linear
incentive scheme18 of the form
SA = α0 + α1x1 + α2x2 ; SB = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2, (5)
where α0 ,β0 identify the fixed and α1 ,β1 ,α2 ,β2 the variable wage compensation com-
ponents. Therefore, both agents’ remuneration does not only depend on their own perfor-
mance measure, but also on the one of the respective other agent. Through the values of
parameters α2 andβ1 various types of compensation are differentiated:
a) α2 = 0 ; β1 = 0 (Individual Compensation): Solely the own performance measure
determines wage compensation.
b) α2 < 0 ; β1 < 0 (Relative Performance Evaluation): Own remuneration is negatively
influenced by a better result of the other agent leading to a competitive relationship
between the decentralized divisions.
c) α2 > 0 ; β1 > 0: In this case two subcases have to be differentiated depending on the
signs of α1 and β2:
i) α1 > 0 ; β2 > 0 (Team Based Compensation): Own remuneration is positively
influenced not only by a better own result but also by a better result of the
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other agent. Therefore, there are additional incentives for cooperation between
the agents. The resulting form of cooperation is called induced cooperation.
ii) α1 < 0 ; β2 < 0 (Relative Compensation to the own Division Result): Own
remuneration is raised by higher values of the other agent’s performance measure
while at the same time it is alleviated for better own results.
The agents’ utility functions are exponential with rA > 0 and rB > 0 as coefficients of
absolute risk aversion. Higher values of rA , rB indicate higher degrees of risk aversion. The
principal by contrast is assumed to be risk neutral and therefore maximizes the residuum,
consisting of the two division profits lessened by the agents’ wage compensation payments:
UP = E[x1 + x2 − SA(·)− SB(·)]. (6)
It is further assumed that the agents can differ in their (social) preferences. Apart from
individual monetary interest they also care for the well-being of the respective other. In our
model we restrict the analysis to competitive preferences (rivalry) meaning that an agent
endowed with this sort of social preference strives to differentiate himself from the other
in terms of remuneration, independent of how total wage compensation is distributed.
Formally, we represent such behavior by an additional utility component influencing the
agent’s effort choices. This social preference function is denoted by GA (SA(·) ,SB(·)) as
well as GB (SA(·) ,SB(·)) and compares ex post compensation. If it takes positive values,
the considered agent feels disadvantaged and suffers an additional disutility. Therefore,
the principal has to heighten remuneration in order to guarantee his participation in
the cooperation. By contrast, if a negative value results, the agent receives higher utility
and accepts smaller remuneration. As a consequence, he works more for unchanged wage
payments. In the subsequent analysis, the social preference function enters the agents’
utility calculus with a negative sign and is assumed to take the following form:
GA (SA(·) ,SB(·)) = kA(lASB(·)− SA(·)) (7)
GB (SA(·) ,SB(·)) = kB(lBSA(·)− SB(·)). (8)
The social preference parameter ki denotes the strength of rivalry and can differ between
the agents accounting for their possible heterogeneity (kA , kB ≥ 0). It measures the
degree of disutility resulting from an unequal distribution of remuneration. For kA = 0
(kB = 0) the agent behaves completely egoistically. Rising values of kA (kB) cause higher
utility changes when wage payments are unequally distributed. Consequently, kA and kB
are assumed to lie in the interval kA , kB ∈ [0;∞]. The parameter lA is agent A’s aspiration
level. Formally, it defines for what ratio of remuneration the effect of the social preference
changes signs from utility reducing to utility enhancing. For example, if lA = 1, agent A
is envious and suffers a disutility if he does not earn as much as agent B. However, as
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soon as his remuneration surpasses the one of agent B he is spiteful and gains additional
utility. For values of lA > 1 there exists a region where agent A is unhappy with his own
remuneration relative to agent B’s despite his higher earnings since he does not even grant
agent B his smaller wage compensation. For lA = 2 agent A suffers a disutility if he does
not at least earn twice as much as agent B. In this case he first becomes spiteful, when
the ratio of remuneration SA : SB exceeds the value lA. Values of lA < 1 however would
mean that there exist distributions of income among the agents, where agent A is spiteful
although his remuneration is smaller than the one of agent B. This is not very intuitive
and therefore lA is restricted to the interval lA ∈ [1;∞]. The same analogously holds true
for agent B’s aspiration level lB.
19
Both agents’ exponential utility functions are additively separable in the described
monetary as well as non-monetary components and, under the LEN assumptions, can
also be written using certainty equivalent notation:
CEA = E[SA(·)(1 + kA)− kAlASB(·)]− VA(·)− rA
2
Var[SA(·)(1 + kA)− kAlASB(·)] (9)
CEB = E[SB(·)(1 + kB)− kBlBSA(·)]− VB(·)− rB
2
Var[SB(·)(1 + kB)− kBlBSA(·)]. (10)
E(·) is the expectation and V ar(·) the variance operator. The term ri
2
V ar(·) , i = A,B
constitutes the risk premium, that has to be paid to the agents for imposing risk on them.
It ascends in the risk aversion coefficients ri and, everything else being positive, also in
the piece rates α1 ,β1 ,α2 ,β2, the variances of the respective performance metric σ
2
1 ,σ
2
2 as
well as the correlation coefficient %. For ri = 0 the agents are risk neutral and fluctuations
in wage compensation are of no relevance.
4 Incentive system in case of productive interaction
4.1 Calculation of the optimal incentive system with productive interaction
Division of labor and specialization in an increasingly complex work environment give
rise to situations where agents cannot make their decisions independently of one another.
Instead they are expected to cooperate in the fulfillment of their tasks in order to exploit
possible efficiency gains. This particularly concerns the internal transfer of technical know-
how as well as the support of other divisions, if they either lack capacity or necessary
specific knowledge. Such situations, where agents are supposed to work together, can best
be captured by a production technology as given in equation 1.
We proceed by solving the model described above with respect to the decision para-
meters in case of productive interaction. The agents’ reaction functions are obtained by
differentiation of their incentive compatibility constraints with respect to a1 , a2 and b1 , b2:
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a1 =
(1 + kA)pA1α1 − kAlApA1β1
cA1
; a2 =
(1 + kA)pA2α2 − kAlApA2β2
cA2
(11)
b1 =
(1 + kB)pB1β1 − kBlBpB1α1
cB1
; b2 =
(1 + kB)pB2β2 − kBlBpB2α2
cB2
. (12)
The reservation utilities are normalized to zero and the two agents’ participation cons-
traints bind in the optimum. Performing the typical optimization steps leads to:
Proposition 1 (Wage compensation system with rivalry in the case of produc-
tive interaction):
α1 =
1 + kB
1 + kB + kBlB
· PA1
P
+
kAlA
1 + kA + kAlA
· QB1
Q
(13)
α2 =
1 + kB
1 + kB + kBlB
· PA2
P
+
kAlA
1 + kA + kAlA
· QB2
Q
(14)
β1 =
1 + kA
1 + kA + kAlA
· QB1
Q
+
kBlB
1 + kB + kBlB
· PA1
P
(15)
β2 =
1 + kA
1 + kA + kAlA
· QB2
Q
+
kBlB
1 + kB + kBlB
· PA2
P
(16)
with
PA1 = p
2
A1p
2
A2 + rAσ2(p
2
A1cA2σ2 − p2A2cA1σ1%) > 0 (17)
PA2 = p
2
A1p
2
A2 + rAσ1(p
2
A2cA1σ1 − p2A1cA2σ2%) ≷ 0 (18)
QB1 = p
2
B1p
2
B2 + rBσ2(p
2
B1cB2σ2 − p2B2cB1σ1%) ≷ 0 (19)
QB2 = p
2
B1p
2
B2 + rBσ1(p
2
B2cB1σ1 − p2B1cB2σ2%) > 0 (20)
as well as
P = p2A1p
2
A2 + rA(p
2
A1cA2σ
2
2 + p
2
A2cA1σ
2
1) + r
2
AcA1cA2σ
2
1σ
2
2(1− %2) > 0 (21)
Q = p2B1p
2
B2 + rB(p
2
B1cB2σ
2
2 + p
2
B2cB1σ
2
1) + r
2
BcB1cB2σ
2
1σ
2
2(1− %2) > 0. (22)
Agent A reacts through his effort choices
a∗1 =
pA1
cA1
· (1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB
1 + kB + kBlB
· p
2
A1p
2
A2 + rAσ2(p
2
A1cA2σ2 − p2A2cA1σ1%)
P
(23)
a∗2 =
pA2
cA2
· (1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB
1 + kB + kBlB
· p
2
A1p
2
A2 + rAσ1(p
2
A2cA1σ1 − p2A1cA2σ2%)
P
. (24)
For agent B one receives correspondingly
b∗1 =
pB1
cB1
· (1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB
1 + kA + kAlA
· p
2
B1p
2
B2 + rBσ2(p
2
B1cB2σ2 − p2B2cB1σ1%)
Q
(25)
b∗2 =
pB2
cB2
· (1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB
1 + kA + kAlA
· p
2
B1p
2
B2 + rBσ1(p
2
B2cB1σ1 − p2B1cB2σ2%)
Q
. (26)
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The fixed wage compensation components α0 , β0 are defined, such that both agents’ par-
ticipation constraints are binding. The principal thus reacts to each of his agents’ rivalry
through a reallocation of incentive intensity, where piece rates α1 and β1 as well as α2
and β2 are intertwined. This measure has major consequences for the weighting and the
combination of performance measures. These consequences depend on the relative strength
of the two agents’ respective social preferences as well as on the type of compensation they
would receive in a situation of purely egoistical behavior. (Proof: See the appendix)
First, it has to be stated, that a separation of the decision problem in the presence
of stochastic dependencies and social preferences is not possible,20 since every piece rate
simultaneously fulfills several functions. The subsequent analysis of the piece rates given
in proposition 1, seeks to provide a thorough understanding of these interacting effects
and draws conclusions of how to balance performance measures depending on the charac-
teristics of the three interdependencies considered. From the previous literature it is well-
known, that stochastic dependencies further the merits of relative performance evaluation.
This form of remuneration enables the principal to optimally exploit all the information
contained in the agents’ performance measures, reduces their exposure to risk and thus
leads to higher values of the objective function. In the presence of productive interaction
(technological interdependency) however, the resulting competitive relation between the
agents yields the danger of counterproductive actions (sabotage). Therefore, team based
compensation can be beneficial, depending in particular on the value of the correlation
coefficient, that must not exceed a certain critical value. Building on this work and in-
troducing social preferences, our main goal is to show how the optimality conditions for
relative performance evaluation and team based compensation as well as the weightings
of performance measures are affected through the consideration of rivalry (psychological
interdependency). We therefore suppose that a threshold value for the correlation coeffi-
cient exists, meaning that the formal relations p2A1σ2cA2 − p2A2σ1cA1 > p
2
A1p
2
A2
rAσ1
as well as
p2B2σ1cB1−p2B1σ2cB2 > p
2
B1p
2
B2
rBσ2
hold. They express, that it is easier for the principal to mo-
tivate an agent for his own task rather than the one of the other agent. This assumption
generalizes our analysis since we allow for piece rates α2 and β1 to switch signs depending
on the value of %. For the sake of expositional clearness, we proceed by differentiating the
cases of one- (kA > 0 , kB = 0) and two-sided (kA , kB > 0) rivalry.
4.2 Functions and interrelations of the piece rates for one-sided rivalry
4.2.1 Examination of piece rates β1 and α1
When agent B behaves completely egoistically (kB = 0), the expressions for the opti-
mal values of piece rates α1 and β1 in equations 13 and 15 reduce to:
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α1 =
p2A1p
2
A2 + rAσ2(p
2
A1cA2σ2 − p2A2cA1σ1%)
P
+
kAlA
1 + kA + kAlA
· QB1
Q
(27)
β1 =
1 + kA
1 + kA + kAlA
· QB1
Q
. (28)
Parameter β1 in equation 28 simultaneously serves three functions, each of which has its
foundation in a different form of interdependency between the agents: Its first function is
the impact as insurance parameter and is primarily due to the stochastic interdependency
expressed through positive values of the correlation coefficient %. From standard agency
models21 it is known, that this parameter can be used to reduce agent B’s exposure to
risk, if it is chosen by the principal with a negative sign. However, more generally spoken
it can be stated, that a smaller β1 leads to smaller risk and therefore this first effect
implies a reduction of its value. The second function is the effect, that in a situation of
productive interaction β1 not only has an influence on agent B’s exposure to risk but also
determines the efforts he takes to affect agent A’s performance measure. This additional
incentive effect is caused by the structure of the production technology in equation 1,
which contains a technological interdependency furthering the need to provide incentives
for help rather than sabotage. This raises β1’s value, as can also be seen from agent B’s
reaction function in equation 12. Finally, in the third function agent A’s rivalry, imposing
a psychological interdependency between the agents, is incorporated. Its impact on the
value of piece rate β1 and thus on agent A’s effort a1, depends on which one of the above
stated first two effects dominates, since this determines whether the principal links agent
B’s remuneration positively or negatively to agent A’s performance measure.
As a consequence, the principal’s decision of whether to pay agent B according to
relative performance evaluation or a team based compensation scheme is independent of
A’s rivalry. The threshold of B’s correlation coefficient takes the same value as in a situa-
tion of purely egoistical behavior, meaning that although A’s rivalry impacts the absolute
value of β1, it does not affect its sign. Hence the influence of A’s rivalry on piece rate
β1 and therefore on A’s effort a1 reverses exactly for the critical value of the correlati-
on coefficient. If the insurance effect dominates the effect of providing B with incentives
for cooperative behavior, piece rate β1 is negative. According to the reaction function in
equation 11, it then simultaneously provides agent A with additional incentives for efforts
in his own division. To see why this is the case, bear in mind that higher values of a1 raise
the expected value of performance measure x1, and α1 ,β1 are the two agents’ respective
shares in this performance measure. When α1 > 0 and β1 < 0, higher values of x1 and thus
higher efforts a1 benefit the competitive agent A in two ways. Directly through higher own
remuneration and indirectly through reduced remuneration of agent B. Therefore, agent
A’s rivalry furthers his ambition to differentiate himself as much as possible from agent
B in terms of wage compensation, leading to a higher intrinsic motivation when β1 is be-
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low zero and preferably small. Nevertheless, this additional incentive effect not only has
positive consequences for the principal but at the same time also diminishes utility, since
he has to compensate agent A for his higher effort costs and for his increased exposure to
risk. The latter arises since uncertainty ascends in decreasing β1 (β1 < 0):
RiskA =
rA
2
{[α1(1 + kA)− kAlAβ1]2σ21 + [α2(1 + kA)− kAlAβ2]2σ22+
2[α1(1 + kA)− kAlAβ1][α2(1 + kA)− kAlAβ2]σ1σ2%}. (29)
This causes the need for the principal to establish an additional trade-off between incentive
provision and exposure to risk, that only indirectly comes into being through the existence
of the psychological interdependency. Thus, the value of β1 increases with a stronger
development of A’s rivalry kA ↑.
If conversely the incentive effect dominates the insurance effect, the value of β1 is
positive leading to decreasing incentives for efforts of agent A in his own division, since
higher levels of a1 would not only cause him but also his rival B a higher remuneration. In
the considered case of rivalry, A suffers a comparative utility loss when B earns more, and
therefore he reduces all activities that on the one side may benefit him, but on the other at
the same time benefit agent B, whom he looks at as an opponent. This indicates that am-
bition can sometimes also have harmful consequences and inhibit an employee’s capability,
if the principal does not appropriately take his agents’ social preferences into considera-
tion.22 The value of β1 shrinks with a stronger development of A’s social preference kA.
Figure 123 three-dimensionally displays the values of piece rate β1 (z-axis) in dependence
of the strength of rivalry kA (y-axis) and the strength of the stochastic dependency %
(x-axis).24 The horizontally drawn supporting layer contains all %-kA-combinations, for
which piece rate β1 is zero. The graph illustrates, that the run of the β1(%, kA)-layer gets
flatter, as kA takes greater values. This means that a change in the weighting of rivalry
kA has bigger influence on β1 for smaller values of kA. The stronger the development of
agent A’s rivalry, the lesser its marginal impact on β1. The crossing curve of the layers
drawn in the figure is a straight line separating the positive from the negative codomain
of β1 and thus reflecting the independence of the correlation’s threshold coefficient from
the strength of agent A’s rivalry. The change of kurtosis contained in the β1(%, kA)-layer
represents the reversion of the impact of rivalry on the value of piece rate β1 in either the
positive or the negative direction.
The value of piece rate α1 depends on β1 as can be seen from the formal relation
α1 =
p2A1p
2
A2 + rAσ2(p
2
A1cA2σ2 − p2A2cA1σ1%)
P
+
kAlA
1 + kA
β1. (30)
It immediately becomes clear from equation 30, that the principal reduces the direct
incentive intensity provided through parameter α1, if β1 takes negative values. As was
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Figure 1: Codomain of piece rate β1 in dependence of the correlation coefficient % as well as
the strength of rivalry kA in a situation with productive interaction.
already mentioned above, in this situation agent A’s effort a1 increases with ascending
absolute values of β1. Thus, in order to avoid inefficiently high effort levels and to achieve a
(pareto-)efficient risk allocation, the principal needs to reduce the direct incentive intensity
α1 by a corresponding amount. Conversely, if β1 takes positive values, the principal needs
to enhance this direct incentive intensity. Otherwise agent A’s effort level falls short of his
expectations.
4.2.2 Examination of piece rates α2 and β2
In case of kB = 0 the expressions for the optimal values of piece rates α2 and β2 in
equations 14 and 16 reduce to:
α2 =
p2A1p
2
A2 + rAσ1(p
2
A2cA1σ1 − p2A1cA2σ2%)
P
+
kAlA
1 + kA + kAlA
· QB2
Q
(31)
β2 =
1 + kA
1 + kA + kAlA
· QB2
Q
. (32)
When choosing piece rate α2 for agent A in equation 31 the principal, according to his
proceeding for the definition of β1, has to establish a trade-off between efficient incentive
provision and risk allocation taking rivalry into consideration. Differences arise since social
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preferences only impact the value of α2 through the additive composition with piece rate
β2, as can be seen from the mathematical expression in equation 31, that can also be
written as:
α2 =
p2A1p
2
A2 + rAσ1(p
2
A2cA1σ1 − p2A1cA2σ2%)
P
+
kAlA
1 + kA
β2. (33)
Agent A, due to his rivalry, additionally participates in B’s performance measure x2 be-
cause of the principal’s reallocation from β2 to α2. Since the codomain of β2 is strictly
above zero, this leads to higher values of α2. The consequence for agent A is an increase in
his incentive intensity for efforts to support B in the execution of his task meaning that the
relative advantageousness of team based compensation compared to relative performance
evaluation augments. The threshold value of the correlation coefficient, for which piece
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Figure 2: Codomain of piece rate α2 in dependence of the correlation coefficient % as well as
the strength of rivalry kA in a situation with productive interaction.
rate α2 switches signs thus takes higher values when A’s rivalry is stronger developed.
Figure 2 exemplarily depicts the codomain of α2 (z-axis) in dependence of the strength of
rivalry kA (y-axis) and the strength of the stochastic dependency % (x-axis).
25 The hori-
zontally running supporting layer is again the set of all %-kA-combinations, for which the
value of piece rate α2 is zero. In the diagram the kurtosis of the α2(%, kA)-layer becomes
increasingly flat for ascending values of kA on the one side and falling values of % on the
other meaning that the marginal impact of rivalry decreases for higher values of kA and
lower values of %. The cutting curve of the two layers drawn in figure 2 again separates the
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positive codomain of α2 from the negative and rises in kA. Therefore, the threshold value
of the correlation coefficient becomes larger when agent A’s rivalry is stronger developed.
The second derivative of the %∗(kA)-curve is negative reflecting the decreasing marginal
impact of social preferences.
As a result of the principal’s reallocation between the agents, piece rate β2 in equation
32 is reduced because of agent A’s rivalry. The principal hazards the negative consequences
of a lower incentive intensity for agent B, since this measure is necessary for him to
optimally account for A’s rivalry.
4.3 Combined effects in the definition of the piece rates for two-sided rivalry
If both agents simultaneously exhibit rivalry, the reallocation measures the principal
has to take are mutually overlapping. For the analysis of their respective relationship
table 1 distinguishes four cases, in which the mathematical expressions PA2 = p
2
A1p
2
A2 +
rAσ1(p
2
A2cA1σ1−p2A1cA2σ2%) andQB1 = p2B1p2B2+rBσ2(p2B1cB2σ2−p2B2cB1σ1%) are positive or
negative, indicating whether relative performance evaluation or team based compensation
would be optimal for purely egoistical behavior of A and B. In either case, the impact of
a stronger developed rivalry on the weighting of performance measures x1 and x2 in each
of the agents’ wage compensation systems is displayed. Our purpose here is to focus on
the qualitative effects of heterogeneously developed social preferences rather than going
into explanatory detail. However, due to additive separability within the expressions for
all four piece rates, the underlying economic mechanisms can be interpreted according to
the exposition in the previous section.
• Case 1 (PA2 < 0 and QB1 < 0): In the absence of social preferences both agents are
rewarded according to relative performance evaluation. Their remuneration shrinks
when the respective other performs well. In the case of two-sided rivalry it shows,
that the agents’ social preferences operate in the same direction for each of the piece
rates α1 ,α2 ,β1 ,β2. This leads to a decrease of the agents’ incentive intensities α1
and β2, which are used to enhance their efforts with respect to own division results.
At the same time the incentive intensities α2 and β1 for the provision of efforts in the
respective other agent’s division result are increasing with stronger developed rivalry.
Therefore the advantages of relative performance evaluation compared to team based
compensation further diminish in the case of two-sided rivalry. This can even lead to
an extreme form of relative performance evaluation, where both agents are paid on
the basis of the respective other’s performance measure and relative to their own.26
• Case 2 (PA2 > 0 and QB1 > 0): In the situation of purely egoistical behavior, a
team based compensation scheme is optimal for both agents. If they exhibit rivalry,
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Case
Agent A Agent B
α1 α2 β1 β2
1
FOC
∂α1
∂kA
< 0 ;
∂α1
∂kB
< 0
∂α2
∂kA
> 0 ;
∂α2
∂kB
> 0
∂β1
∂kA
> 0 ;
∂β1
∂kB
> 0
∂β2
∂kA
< 0 ;
∂β2
∂kB
< 0
kA ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
kB ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
2
FOC
∂α1
∂kA
> 0 ;
∂α1
∂kB
< 0
∂α2
∂kA
> 0 ;
∂α2
∂kB
< 0
∂β1
∂kA
< 0 ;
∂β1
∂kB
> 0
∂β2
∂kA
< 0 ;
∂β2
∂kB
> 0
kA ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
kB ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
3
FOC
∂α1
∂kA
< 0 ;
∂α1
∂kB
< 0
∂α2
∂kA
> 0 ;
∂α2
∂kB
< 0
∂β1
∂kA
> 0 ;
∂β1
∂kB
> 0
∂β2
∂kA
< 0 ;
∂β2
∂kB
> 0
kA ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
kB ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
4
FOC
∂α1
∂kA
> 0 ;
∂α1
∂kB
< 0
∂α2
∂kA
> 0 ;
∂α2
∂kB
> 0
∂β1
∂kA
< 0 ;
∂β1
∂kB
> 0
∂β2
∂kA
< 0 ;
∂β2
∂kB
< 0
kA ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
kB ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
Table 1: Impacts of varying developments of both agents’ rivalry on the four piece rates in a
situation with productive interaction.
the principal’s necessary reallocations in order to account for each of the agents’
social preferences work in exactly the opposite directions for each of the four pieces.
Resulting from this is, that the effects described in the previous section cancel each
other more and more, if the two agents’ rivalry is equally strong developed. A trade-
off between team based compensation and relative performance evaluation is not
necessary in this situation.
• Case 3 (PA2 > 0 and QB1 < 0): When social preferences are absent, Agent A is
paid according to team based compensation while agent B receives his remuneration
based on the relative performance compared to A. In a situation of two-sided rivalry,
the necessary reallocations for piece rates α1 and β1 correspond to the ones in case 1,
while for piece rates α2 and β2 they correspond to those in case 2. Accordingly, the
impacts of the two agents’ social preferences work in the same direction for piece ra-
tes α1 and β1 but in opposing directions for α2 and β2. The relative advantageousness
of team based compensation for agent B augments. Agent A’s basic type of compen-
sation generically remains unchanged. Also in this case, only for extreme parameter
constellations an evaluation relative to the own division result for him can turn out
to be optimal.
• Case 4 (PA2 < 0 and QB1 > 0): In the treatment of purely egoistical behavior, for
agent A relative performance evaluation, for agent B team based compensation proves
to be optimal. According to the analysis of case 3, in a situation of two sided-rivalry
their social preferences work in the same directions for α2 and β2, but in opposing
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directions for α1 and β1. The consequences with respect to the wage compensation
system are analogous to case 3 .
5 Incentive system in case of a production externality
5.1 Calculation of the optimal incentive system with a production externality
In the previous section we have analyzed the situation of a principal-agent relation-
ship, where the agents could distribute their efforts on actions to manipulate their own
performance measure or on actions to affect the respective other’s division result. In reali-
ty however there often occur situations, in which other organizational units automatically
profit from the efforts an agent primarily provides to affect his own performance measure.
For example, one can think of a value chain with vertical integration27, where one division
produces a good, that is directly sold to the market and simultaneously serves as an input
for internal usage in a different department. In this setting all divisions involved gain uti-
lity from higher efforts in the production of the good. Marketing actions to strengthen an
overall brand name serve as a different example, since all product managers profit from
these activities at the same time. More generally spoken, many synergy effects go back
to the existence of production externalities. If the notation of production is, as is usual
done in agency models, broadly interpreted as efforts to influence certain performance
indicators, the findings with the model development below are of empirical relevance for
a broad variety of practical applications.
The calculations are analogous to the case of productive interaction. This time the
production technology has the form of equation 2 and the corresponding cost functions
are given through equation 4. The agents’ reaction functions thus are:
a1 =
(1 + kA)(α1 + pA2α2)− kAlA(β1 + pA2β2)
cA1
(34)
b2 =
(1 + kB)(pB1β1 + β2)− kBlB(pB1α1 + α2)
cB2
. (35)
The agents’ reservation utilities are again scaled to zero. Conducting the same typical
optimization steps as in the case of productive interaction leads to:
Proposition 2 (Wage compensation system with rivalry in the case of a pro-
duction externality):
α1 =
1 + kB
1 + kB + kBlB
· XA1
X
+
kAlA
1 + kA + kAlA
· YB1
Y
(36)
α2 =
1 + kB
1 + kB + kBlB
· XA2
X
+
kAlA
1 + kA + kAlA
· YB2
Y
(37)
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β1 =
1 + kA
1 + kA + kAlA
· YB1
Y
+
kBlB
1 + kB + kBlB
· XA1
X
(38)
β2 =
1 + kA
1 + kA + kAlA
· YB2
Y
+
kBlB
1 + kB + kBlB
· XA2
X
(39)
where
XA1 = rAcA1σ2(1 + pA2) · (σ2 − pA2σ1%) ≷ 0 (40)
XA2 = rAcA1σ1(1 + pA2) · (pA2σ1 − σ2%) ≷ 0 (41)
YB1 = rBcB2σ2(1 + pB1) · (pB1σ2 − σ1%) ≷ 0 (42)
YB2 = rBcB2σ1(1 + pB1) · (σ1 − pB1σ2%) ≷ 0 (43)
as well as
X = rAcA1σ
2
2 + p
2
A2rAcA1σ
2
1 + r
2
Ac
2
A1σ
2
1σ
2
2(1− %2)− 2pA2rAcA1σ1σ2% > 0 (44)
Y = p2B1rBcB2σ
2
2 + rBcB2σ
2
1 + r
2
Bc
2
B2σ
2
1σ
2
2(1− %2)− 2pB1rBcB2σ1σ2% > 0. (45)
Agent A’s reaction can be expressed by
a∗∗1 =
1
cA1
· (1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB
1 + kB + kBlB
· rAcA1σ2(1 + pA2) · (σ2 − pA2σ1%)
X
+
pA2
cA1
· (1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB
1 + kB + kBlB
· rAcA1σ1(1 + pA2) · (pA2σ1 − σ2%)
X
. (46)
For agent B we accordingly obtain:
b∗∗2 =
pB1
cB2
· (1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB
1 + kA + kAlA
· rBcB2σ2(1 + pB1) · (pB1σ2 − σ1%)
Y
+
1
cB2
· (1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB
1 + kA + kAlA
· rBcB2σ1(1 + pB1) · (σ1 − pB1σ2%)
Y
. (47)
The fixed wage compensation components α0 , β0 are defined such that the agents’ par-
ticipation constraints are binding. The principal again reacts to his agents’ rivalry by
reallocating incentive intensity through shifting between α1 and β1 as well as α2 and β2.
The qualitative effects on the the weighting and the combination of performance measures
depend on the sign, each of the four piece rates would receive for purely egoistical behavior.
(Proof: See the appendix)
A comparison of the results given in propositions 1 and 2 reveals, that the formal
structure is the same. In either case, the mathematical expressions for the piece rates are
composed of two summands, each consisting of a weighting factor that is determined by
the social preference parameters ki and li as well as an additional multiplicatively linked
term, known from the situation of purely egoistical behavior. Differences arise, since the
latter have other properties than in the case of productive interaction. As is known from
standard agency models28, the principal in their definition again has to establish a trade-
off between two opposing effects. He can either internalize the production externality by
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Agent A Agent B
α1 α2 β1 β2
Numerator > 0, if pA2 <
σ2
σ1%
pA2 >
σ2
σ1
% pB1 >
σ1
σ2
% pB1 <
σ1
σ2%
Team based compensation, if
σ2
σ1
% < pA2 <
σ2
σ1%
σ1
σ2
% < pB1 <
σ1
σ2%
Relative evaluation with respect
to the other’s result, if
pA2 <
σ2
σ1
% pB1 <
σ1
σ2
%
Relative evaluation with respect
to the own result, if
pA2 >
σ2
σ1%
pB1 >
σ1
σ2%
Table 2: Optimality conditions for team based compensation and relative performance evalua-
tion with a production externality in a situation of purely egoistical behavior.
applying team based compensation or choose to reduce the agents’ exposure to risk when
% is large. Table 2 summarizes the optimality conditions. It shows, that in contrast to
our previous analysis, three types of wage compensation can be optimal. Additionally,
their advantageousness in the absence of social preferences does not only depend on the
correlation coefficient % but also on the relative risk σ2
σ1
(σ1
σ2
) and the strength of the
production externality pA2 (pB1).
29 Building on these results, our purpose again is to
examine how the optimality conditions for the different types of compensation change
due to the principal’s reallocations when the agents behave competitively. We therefore
again differentiate the cases of one-sided and two-sided rivalry.
5.2 Balancing performance measures in case of one-sided rivalry
In case of one-sided rivalry (kB = 0) the optimal values for the piece rates in equations
36–39 simplify to:
α1 =
rAcA1σ2(1 + pA2) · (σ2 − pA2σ1%)
X
+
kAlA
1 + kA + kAlA
· YB1
Y
(48)
α2 =
rAcA1σ1(1 + pA2) · (pA2σ1 − σ2%)
X
+
kAlA
1 + kA + kAlA
· YB2
Y
(49)
β1 =
1 + kA
1 + kA + kAlA
· YB1
Y
(50)
β2 =
1 + kA
1 + kA + kAlA
· YB2
Y
. (51)
Differences to the case of productive interaction arise since the mathematical expressions
YB1 = rBcB2σ2(1 + pB1) · (pB1σ2 − σ1%) and YB2 = rBcB2σ1(1 + pB1) · (σ1 − pB1σ2%),
that are affected by the principal’s reallocations, can both either take positive or negative
values. Therefore, the analysis proceeds by differentiating three cases according to agent
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B’s type of compensation, that are summarized in table 3. In addition to that we focus
on the qualitative insights, since the underlying mechanisms of action can analogously be
explained as was done in the case of productive interaction considered above.
Case Value of pB1 Impact of kA ↑
β1 β2 α1 α2 β1 β2
1 pB1 >
σ1
σ2
% pB1 <
σ1
σ2%
↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
2 pB1 <
σ1
σ2
% ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
3 pB1 >
σ1
σ2%
↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Table 3: Impact of a change in agent A’s strength of rivalry kA on the four piece rates in
dependence of the strength of agent B’s production externality pB1.
• Case 1 (YB1 > 0 ,YB2 > 0): Agent B is paid according to team based compensation.
The weighting of both performance measures x1 and x2 in his wage compensation
system is reduced due to agent A’s rivalry. His incentive intensity diminishes. In
turn the performance measures are correspondingly stronger weighted in agent A’s
wage compensation system. For him the relative advantageousness of team based
compensation compared to relative performance evaluation therefore augments.
• Case 2 (YB1 < 0 ,YB2 > 0): Agent B is evaluated relative to A’s division result. Due
to the reduction of piece rate α1 with simultaneous enhancement of α2, changes in the
type of compensation are possible for agent A. If, in the situation of purely egoistical
behavior A would be rewarded relative to B, the possibility exists, that now because
of his rivalry team based compensation becomes optimal from firm perspective.30
Accordingly, the initial advantageousness of team based compensation can switch in
a way, that after the principal’s reallocations a compensation relative to the own
division result is superior. This possibility only exists, if piece rate α1 takes a very
small value in the situation without social preferences. Under these circumstances
the principal concentrates on piece rate α2 in his provision of incentives. It is thus
only a matter of a marginal effect.
• Case 3 (YB1 > 0 ,YB2 < 0): Agent B is rewarded on basis of agent A’s performance
measure x1 and relative to his own division result x2. The reduced intrinsic motivation
of agent A as the result of β1 > 0 is counterbalanced by the principal with an increase
of his incentive intensity through enhancing α1. By contrast β2 < 0 causes a gain in
A’s intrinsic motivation and is used for risk reduction purposes through decreasing
α2. The examination of these measures’ effects on agent A’s wage compensation type
again takes his type of compensation in a situation of purely egoistical behavior
as a starting point. If he was remunerated according to team aspects, in the case
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of rivalry a relative evaluation compared to B can prove to be optimal depending
on the strength of his social preference. By contrast the possibility exists, that the
optimality of a relative evaluation with respect to A’s own division result reverses to
the advantageousness of team based compensation.
5.3 Balancing performance measures in case of two-sided rivalry
In a situation with two-sided social preferences, each agent’s rivalry affects all four
piece rates. For this reason it again comes to an overlap of the previously described effects.
We focus our analysis on whether an agent’s stronger developed rivalry has an increasing
or a decreasing effect on the definition of piece rates α1 ,α2 ,β1 ,β2, whereupon the question
of how the various influences interact has to be answered. Do they operate in the same or
in opposing directions? The answer to this question primarily depends on the principal’s
type of compensation in the case of purely egoistical behavior. It determines whether the
agents, due to the principal’s reallocations, participate in positive or negative shares of the
respective other. Given that each of the terms XA1, XA2, YB1 and YB2 in equations 40–43
can switch signs, for every agent three types of compensation can prove to be optimal
leading to a total of nine possible cases, that are contrasted in table 4. In order to put
ResultCase Value of pA2 Value of pB1 ki ↑ α1 α2 β1 β2
kA ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓1 σ2
σ1
% < pA2 <
σ2
σ1%
σ1
σ2
% < pB1 <
σ1
σ2% kB ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
kA ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓2 pA2 < σ2
σ1
% pB1 <
σ1
σ2
%
kB ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
kA ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑3 pA2 > σ2
σ1%
pB1 >
σ1
σ2% kB ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
kA ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓4 σ2
σ1
% < pA2 <
σ2
σ1%
pB1 <
σ1
σ2
%
kB ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
kA ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑5 σ2
σ1
% < pA2 <
σ2
σ1%
pB1 >
σ1
σ2% kB ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
kA ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓6 pA2 < σ2
σ1
%
σ1
σ2
% < pB1 <
σ1
σ2% kB ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
kA ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓7 pA2 > σ2
σ1%
σ1
σ2
% < pB1 <
σ1
σ2% kB ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
kA ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑8 pA2 < σ2
σ1
% pB1 >
σ1
σ2% kB ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
kA ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓9 pA2 > σ2
σ1%
pB1 <
σ1
σ2
%
kB ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Table 4: Impacts of a change in the weighting of both agents’ rivalry kA and kB on the four
piece rates in dependence of the values for the production externalities pA2 and pB1.
emphasis on the empirical relevance, we forgo discussing each of them in detail and deduce
statements of a more general nature, which emerge from the overall-view.
The two agents’ rivalry has no impact on the type of compensation employed by
the principal, if their wage compensation systems in the absence of social preferences
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would equally depend (that is positive or negative connection) on the two performance
measures. This applies to cases one, eight and nine. In these examinations the impacts
of the two agents’ rivalry tend to cancel each other, such that the principal only needs
to apprehend minor corrections in his incentive system. In all other cases, changes in
the principal’s compensation type compared to the situation without social preferences
can occur for both agents, where it has to be differentiated, whether these variations in
the agents’ wage compensation systems either refer to both performance measures (cases
two and three) or only to one performance measure (cases four, five, six and seven). If
for kA = kB = 0 both agents are remunerated relatively to one another, as is done in
the cases two and three, the principal’s measures point in the same direction for all four
piece rates α1 ,α2 ,β1 ,β2. The initially negative parameter values augment, the positive
ones decline meaning that in this consideration, the absolute values of all piece rates
assimilate at a smaller level than in the case without social preferences. The originally
highly asymmetric contract offers, where only one agent profits, if one of the measures x1
and x2 takes high values, converge for two-sided rivalry. The relative advantageousness of
team based compensation therefore augments.31 A corresponding harmonization for the
absolute values of α1 ,α2 ,β1 ,β2 is asserted in cases four, five, six and seven with respect
to the performance measure, in which the agents would be opposingly involved, if social
preferences were not an issue. For the respective other metric the effects tend to cancel
each other, since the agents’ participations point in the same direction. These conclusions
hold independently of what type of compensation in detail proves to be optimal.
Summarizing, the principal reacts to equally strong developed social preferences of
his agents with an assimilation of their wage compensation systems. This becomes clear
from the fact, that both agents’ wage compensation does increasingly similar depend on
each of the performance measures available.32 Growing asymmetries in the strength of
development of both agents’ rivalry as well as the other parameters, characterizing their
personality or the exogenous environmental influences, lead to more asymmetrical incen-
tive contracts. These observations are also the driving forces for the results obtained in
the case of productive interaction. They even generalize to a situation of technological in-
dependence33 and consequently hold irrespective of the underlying production technology.
6 Impacts of rivalry on firm profitability
Rivalry leads to the ambition of the agents to differentiate as much as possible from one
another in terms or remuneration. When technological interdependencies are present, this
competitive spirit does not necessarily need to have only positive consequences, since the
agents are supposed to take the effects of their efforts on the respective other’s division
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result into account. It even has to be assumed that their willingness to take actions,
that reduce the relevant reference agent’s profits, increases in such an environment.34
Thus, value for the principal would be destroyed causing negative consequences on firm
profitability. We first consider the case of productive interaction.
Proposition 3 (Consequences of Rivalry on Firm Profitability in Case of Pro-
ductive Interaction): The principal can usually exploit an agent’s rivalry in case of
one-sided social preferences, if he defines the piece rates according to the terms given in
equations 13–16 and if the egoistical agent’s contribution to firm profits does not by far
exceed the one from the competitive agent. The principal’s utility gains are then the larger,
the stronger developed rivalry is for the respective agent. By contrast, an agent’s rivalry
generally leads to a reduction of firm profits, if the extractable utility from the egoistical
agent by far exceeds the one of the competitive agent. In case of two-sided social preferences
it’s optimal from firm perspective, if only one agent exhibits preferably strong developed
rivalry, while the other behaves completely egoistically. If the principal could choose, he
would want the agent to behave competitively, who contributed more to his utility, if social
preferences were not an issue.35 (Proof: See the appendix)
In order to give an intuition for this result, we first consider the case of one-sided
rivalry (kB = 0). Agent A’s contributions to the principal’s goal function take the same
values as in the situation of purely egoistical behavior, weighted by a social preference term
(1+kA) > 1, as can be seen from equations 23 and 24. This term indicates what we call the
intrinsic motivation effect. Due to rivalry the agent wants to differentiate himself as much
as possible from the other. Therefore, he values own remuneration higher, leading to higher
sensitivities with respect to the own incentive intensities α1 and α2, as can be seen from the
reaction functions in equation 11. Thus, for given incentives, the competitive agent invests
higher efforts. This also holds true for counterproductive actions to lessen the respective
other agent’s division result (sabotage) in the case where the principal applies relative
performance evaluation.36 Then the intrinsic motivation effect not only has a positive but
also a negative effect on firm profitability. However, since the principal’s incentives are in
absolute terms always higher for a1 than they are for a2, the positive consequences of the
intrinsic motivation effect always dominate, leading to higher contributions from agent A
to firm profitability. If, by contrast, team based compensation proves to be optimal, agent
A’s incentives for providing positive efforts are enlarged with respect to both divisions due
to his competitive preferences. Thus, the intrinsic motivation effect has positive impacts
on firm profitability.
When examining agent B’s efforts in equations 25 and 26, we again observe, that
they have the same form as in the case of egoistical behavior, but, contrary to A, are
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weighted by the terms 1+kA
1+kA+kAlA
< 1. We call this the extrinsic motivations effect, since it
is caused by the principal’s reallocations as a result of agent A’s rivalry, leading to reduced
extrinsic incentive provision for agent B. This entails an additional positive element, if the
principal employs relative performance evaluation. The reduced extrinsic incentives have
the consequence, that B not only reduces the efforts for his own division result but also
decreases his counterproductive manipulations of A’s measure. However, for analogous
reasons as before, the negative consequences on firm profits dominate. In case of team
based compensation the extrinsic motivation effect brings about reduced efforts in both
divisions. Therefore, the extrinsic motivation effect in total has a negative sign.
When analyzing the total effect of agent A’s rivalry, usually the positive intrinsic
motivation effect dominates over the negative extrinsic motivation effect, since A’s incre-
ased intrinsic motivation has a much higher impact on firm profitability compared to B’s
reduced extrinsic incentives. Only for extreme cases, where B contributes a lot more to
firm profits with his actions than A, it can happen that A’s competitiveness is actually
harmful.
Next we consider two-sided rivalry. In this case the weighting factors take the form
(1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB
1+kB+kB lB
for agent A and (1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB
1+kA+kAlA
for agent B (see equations 23–
26). Thus, examining agent A, we observe that his positive intrinsic motivation effect,
expressed by the factor (1 + kA) is overlaid, by the negative extrinsic motivation effect
1+kB
1+kB+kB lB
, which is due to agent B’s rivalry. However, in the case of two-sided social
preferences, an additional influence has to be included. Because of B’s rivalry, his piece rate
β1 increases by
kB lB
1+kB+kB lB
· p2A1p2A2+rAσ2(p2A1cA2σ2−p2A2cA1σ1%)
P
, which, according to the reaction
function in equation 11, leads to a reduced intrinsic motivation of agent A, who, due to his
own rivalry, dislikes falling behind. As a consequence, the intrinsic motivation effect has
an additional negative component when both agents behave competitively at the same
time. This is reflected in the term − kAlAkB lB
1+kB+kB lB
as further part of A’s weighting factor
(1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB
1+kB+kB lB
. The same interpretations analogously hold true for the weighting
factor in agent B’s effort choices.
From this it can be seen, why the principal only intends one of his agents to behave
competitively.37 If he wants to make use of an agent’s rivalry, the principal has to optimal-
ly react to this agent’s social preferences in the design of his wage compensation system.
As we have seen in the analysis above, this implies, that the principal increases the compe-
titive agent’s variable wage compensation components at the expense of the other agent’s
remuneration. This reallocation accumulates with stronger developed social preferences.
If, in such a situation, the other agent also exhibits rivalry, the principal’s measure to
account for the first agent’s rivalry simultaneously has a negative, that is effort reducing
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effect on the second agent. This means, that the principal is no longer able to establish a
beneficial trade-off through an adequately designed incentive system. Every reallocation
leads to an improvement on the one side, but at the same time yields an aggravation on
the other. The measures, the principal would have to take, if he simultaneously wanted
to account for both agents’ rivalry are inconsistent with one another. Therefore, he can
no longer benefit from their social preferences, if they are equally strong developed. The
value of his goal function remains unchanged at the same level as in the case of purely
egoistical behavior. However, as soon as the agents differ in the strength of their social
preferences, the principal’s profits increase. They reach their maximum, if one agent be-
haves as competitively as possible, while the other is fully egoistical. This result somehow
contrasts the one in Itoh (2004) (p. 42) who derives his conclusion, that the principal can
benefit from the competitive spirit of agents who exhibit rivalry from a model, in which
the agents are completely symmetrical.
A further insight of our model is, that rivalry can be best exploited by the principal,
if it is endowed by an agent with high capability. This agent’s already high productivity is
further enhanced via the ambition to differentiate from his peer. The hereunto necessary
reduction of the other agent’s incentive intensity has comparatively negligible effects on the
overall firm result. By contrast, it harms the principal, if somebody behaves competitively,
who does not contribute a lot to firm profitability. This agent then rather causes trouble
through the need to disadvantage an agent endowed with higher productivity in order to
appropriately account for his rivalry, although he is of comparatively minor importance
with respect to firm value.
Corollary 1 (Consequences of Rivalry on Firm Profitability in Case of a Pro-
duction Function with a Production Externality): In case of a production func-
tion with a production externality the same qualitative insights hold true as in the case
of productive interaction. The principal’s maximal goal function value again is achieved
for preferably differential developments of the two agents’ rivalry, where the agent ideally
should behave competitively, who would make a larger contribution when social preferences
were not an issue.
Corollary 1 is due to the fact, that the weighting factors in the principal’s optimal
goal function value again take the same form as in the case of productive interaction. In
addition to that, for each of the agents the total incentive intensity is always positive,
independent of what type of compensation in detail proves to be optimal. Therefore, the
above argumentation analogously holds, leading to:
Corollary 2 (Consequences of Rivalry on Firm Profitability in Case of Different
Production Functions): The qualitative impacts of (two-sided) rivalry on firm profits
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are independent of the underlying production technology, as long as separate cardinally
scaled performance measures for each of the agents are available.
Itoh (2004)’s (p. 42) conjecture, that the principal’s possibility to make use of his
agents’ rivalry depends on the absence of technological interdependencies, is not con-
firmed in our model. However, the principal may not be able to exploit the agents’ social
preferences when they are engaged in team production in the sense of Alchian/Demsetz
(1972), where their interaction takes the form of a public goods game.38
7 Conclusion
Our study contributes to both the literature on the topic of performance evaluation as
well as in the field of
”
Behavioral Contract Theory“ by examining the impact of two-sided
rivalry on the weighting and the combination of performance measures in case of different
technological interdependencies. Figure 3 summarizes our main results. Due to one agent’s
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Figure 3: Impacts of rivalry on the optimal wage compensation system in a situation with
stochastic and technological interdependencies.
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rivalry, the respective other agent’s shares in the two performance measures x1 and x2 are
partitioned between the two of them. Therefore, the qualitative effects on agent A’s piece
rates depend on B’s type of compensation. In this context, it is of particular importance
whether B’s shares in the performance measures are positive or negative. Positive values
lead to an increase in the competitive agent’s shares, whereupon the respective weigh-
tings of performance measures in B’s wage compensation system simultaneously have to
be reduced. Conversely, negative piece rates of the egoistical agent are augmented by the
respective other agent’s rivalry, while his shares in the corresponding performance measu-
res take lower values. However, the type of compensation for the egoistical agent remains
unchanged, since his shares in the performance measures are only proportionately affected
by the principal’s measures. In case of two-sided rivalry, the principal separately performs
the above described reallocations due to each of the agent’s social preferences at the same
time. Because of the consequential overlapping effects, various changes in the types of
compensation can emerge for each of the agents. When assuming a production technology
with productive interaction, we have shown that, departing from relative performance
evaluation, an agent’s share in the respective other’s division result increases with rising
strength of both agents’ rivalry, making team based compensation more appealing. By
contrast the impacts of the social preferences on this performance measure neutralize, if
team-based compensation was optimal in case of purely egoistical behavior. Therefore,
the relative advantageousness of team based compensation compared to relative perfor-
mance evaluation increases, yielding a possible explanation for why relative performance
evaluation is not so commonly observed in practice despite its theoretical attractiveness.
This general insight however does not unrestrictedly carry over to the case of a production
externality, since in this context also a relative evaluation with respect to the own division
result can prove to be optimal, giving rise to several further constellations that are worth
of mention.
Building on these results concerning performance measurement, we have shown that
the principal’s actions in order to account for each of the agents’ rivalry contradict one
another leading to the fact that he only wants one of his agents to behave competitively.
This ideally should be the agent who would also contribute more in a situation of egoi-
stical behavior, because otherwise rivalry does not necessarily lead to an increase in firm
profitability. However, these findings are constrained by the assumption, that the agents’
rivalry only refers to a comparison of wages. Different results might emerge, if effort costs
are also included in the specifications of the social preference terms. In addition to that
we have taken an extreme point of view through only considering rivalry as a particular-
ly negative type of social preference. Examinations of different, more positive forms like
altruism, inequity aversion and reciprocity are important topics for further research.39 In
25
this context the extension to team production in the sense of Alchian/Demsetz (1972)
seems important, since its public goods character furthers their occurrence. Examining
these open cases will provide a thorough understanding of the interaction of different
types of social preferences as well as the principal’s ability to make use of them. Further-
more additional empirical and experimental studies have to be conducted. Only through
the usage of diverse scientific methodological approaches, the area
”
Behavioral Contract
Theory“ can in the long run come up to the claim of more realistic results and assumptions
compared to classical contract theory.
26
Appendix (Only for Peer Review)
Proof of Proposition 1
Solving the participation constraints with respect to α0, β0 and plugging the resulting
expressions together with the reaction functions in equations 11–12 into the principal’s
utility function 6 yields his optimization problem for the case of productive interaction:
max
α1 ,α2 ,β1 ,β2
UP = (1 + kA)
p2A1
cA1
α1 − kBlB p
2
B1
cB1
α1 + (1 + kA)
p2A2
cA2
α2 − kBlB p
2
B2
cB2
α2+
(1 + kB)
p2B1
cB1
β1 − kAlAp
2
A1
cA1
β1 + (1 + kB)
p2B2
cB2
β2 − kAlAp
2
A2
cA2
β2−
1
2
· (1 + kA)
2(1 + kB + kBlB)
(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB ·
(
p2A1
cA1
α21 +
p2A2
cA2
α22
)
−
1
2
· k
2
Bl
2
B(1 + kA + kAlA)
(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB ·
(
p2B1
cB1
α21 +
p2B2
cB2
α22
)
−
1
2
· (1 + kB)
2(1 + kA + kAlA)
(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB ·
(
p2B1
cB1
β21 +
p2B2
cB2
β22
)
−
1
2
· k
2
Al
2
A(1 + kB + kBlB)
(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB ·
(
p2A1
cA1
β21 +
p2A2
cA2
β22
)
+
kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)
(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB ·
(
p2A1
cA1
α1β1 +
p2A2
cA2
α2β2
)
+
kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)
(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB ·
(
p2B1
cB1
α1β1 +
p2B2
cB2
α2β2
)
−
1 + kA + kAlA
(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB ·RiskB −
1 + kB + kBlB
(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB ·RiskA. (52)
Differentiating with respect to the four piece rates α1 ,α2 ,β1 ,β2 leads after some rear-
rangements to the first order conditions:
Condition 1:
∂UP
∂α1
= 0
⇔ [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB] · [(1 + kA)p2A1cB1 − kBlBp2B1cA1]−
[(1 + kA)
2(1 + kB + kBlB)(p
2
A1 + rAcA1σ
2
1)cB1+
k2Bl
2
B(1 + kA + kAlA)(p
2
B1 + rBcB1σ
2
1)cA1]α1−
[(1 + kA)
2(1 + kB + kBlB)rAcA1cB1σ1σ2%+ k
2
Bl
2
B(1 + kA + kAlA)rBcA1cB1σ1σ2%]α2+
[kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)(p
2
A1 + rAcA1σ
2
1)cB1+
kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)(p
2
B1 + rBcB1σ
2
1)cA1]β1+
[kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)rAcA1cB1σ1σ2%+
kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)rBcA1cB1σ1σ2%]β2 = 0 (53)
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Condition 2:
∂UP
∂α2
= 0
⇔ [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB] · [(1 + kA)p2A2cB2 − kBlBp2B2cA2]−
[(1 + kA)
2(1 + kB + kBlB)rAcA2cB2σ1σ2%+ k
2
Bl
2
B(1 + kA + kAlA)rBcA2cB2σ1σ2%]α1−
[k2Bl
2
B(1 + kA + kAlA)(p
2
B2 + rBcB2σ
2
2)cA2+
(1 + kA)
2(1 + kB + kBlB)(p
2
A2 + rAcA2σ
2
2)cB2]α2+
[kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)rAcA2cB2σ1σ2%+
kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)rBcA2cB2σ1σ2%]β1+
[kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)(p
2
B2 + rBcB2σ
2
2)cA2+
kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)(p
2
A2 + rAcA2σ
2
2)cB2]β2 = 0 (54)
Condition 3:
∂UP
∂β1
= 0
⇔ [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB] · [(1 + kB)p2B1cA1 − kAlAp2A1cB1]+
[kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)(p
2
A1 + rAcA1σ
2
1)cB1+
kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)(p
2
B1 + rBcB1σ
2
1)cA1]α1+
[kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)rAcA1cB1σ1σ2%+
kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)rBcA1cB1σ1σ2%]α2−
[k2Al
2
A(1 + kB + kBlB)(p
2
A1 + rAcA1σ
2
1)cB1+
(1 + kB)
2(1 + kA + kAlA)(p
2
B1 + rBcB1σ
2
1)cA1]β1−
[k2Al
2
A(1 + kB + kBlB)rAcA1cB1σ1σ2%+ (1 + kB)
2(1 + kA + kAlA)rBcA1cB1σ1σ2%]β2 = 0
(55)
Condition 4:
∂UP
∂β2
= 0
⇔ [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB] · [(1 + kB)p2B2cA2 − kAlAp2A2cB2]+
[kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)rAcA2cB2σ1σ2%+
kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)rBcA2cB2σ1σ2%]α1+
[kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)(p
2
B2 + rBcB2σ
2
2)cA2+
kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)(p
2
A2 + rAcA2σ
2
2)cB2]α2−
[k2Al
2
A(1 + kB + kBlB)rAcA2cB2σ1σ2%+ (1 + kB)
2(1 + kA + kAlA)rBcA2cB2σ1σ2%]β1−
[(1 + kB)
2(1 + kA + kAlA)(p
2
B2 + rBcB2σ
2
2)cA2+
k2Al
2
A(1 + kB + kBlB)(p
2
A2 + rAcA2σ
2
2)cB2]β2 = 0 (56)
Solving this system of four equations with four unknown parameters finally results in the
optimal values for the piece rates given in equations 13–16 in the main text. The second
order conditions are fulfilled.
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Proof of Proposition 2
The procedure of calculation is the same as in the case of productive interaction above.
This time the principal’s optimization problem takes the form:
max
α1 ,α2 ,β1 ,β2
UP = (1 + kA)
1
cA1
(1 + pA2)α1 − kBlB pB1
cB2
(1 + pB1)α1+
(1 + kA)
pA2
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cB2
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1
2
· 1
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Differentiating with respect to the four piece rates yields:
Condition 1:
∂UP
∂α1
= 0
⇔ [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB] · [(1 + kA)(1 + pA2)cB2 − kBlB(1 + pB1)pB1cA1]−
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2
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2
Bl
2
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2
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2
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k2Bl
2
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Condition 2:
∂UP
∂α2
= 0
⇔ [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB] · [(1 + kA)(1 + pA2)pA2cB2 − kBlB(1 + pB1)cA1]−
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Condition 3:
∂UP
∂β1
= 0
⇔ [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB] · [(1 + kB)(1 + pB1)pB1cA1 − kAlA(1 + pA2)cB2]+
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kBlB(1 + kB)(1 + kA + kAlA)(pB1 + rBcB2σ1σ2%)cA1]α2−
[(1 + kB)
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Condition 4:
∂UP
∂β2
= 0
⇔ [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB] · [(1 + kB)(1 + pB1)cA1 − kAlA(1 + pA2)pA2cB2]+
[kAlA(1 + kA)(1 + kB + kBlB)(pA2 + rAcA1σ1σ2%)cB2+
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2
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Solving this system of equations results in the optimal values for α1 ,α2 ,β1 ,β2, given in
equations 36–39 in the main text. The second order conditions again are fulfilled.
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Proof of Proposition 3
To show the proposition, we calculate the principal’s optimal goal function value in case
of productive interaction through plugging the optimal values for the piece rates 13–16
together with the agents reactions 23–26 in his goal function 6. This leads us to the formal
expression:
U∗P (kA , kB) =
p2A1
2cA1
· [(1 + kA)(1 + kB)− kAlAkBlB]
1 + kB + kBlB
· p
2
A1p
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P
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Q
. (62)
Each of the summands in 62 consists of two terms: One that is constituted by social
preferences and one that is known form the situation of purely egoistical behavior. There-
fore, we proceed by first considering the case of one-sided social preferences (kB = 0). In
this case [(1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB ]
1+kB+kB lB
becomes (1 + kA) and
[(1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB ]
1+kA+kAlA
simplifies to
1+kA
1+kA+kAlA
. Since (1 + kA) increases at a much higher rate than
1+kA
1+kA+kAlA
decreases, the
principal always profits from A’s social preferences, when
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. (63)
If this condition is not fulfilled he still normally profits from A’s rivalry, if kA is sufficiently
large. Only if
p2B1p
2
B2 + rBσ2(p
2
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Q
+
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P
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P
, (64)
A’s stronger developed rivalry usually leads to a reduction of the principal’s goal function
value. This establishes part one of the proposition. To see the interplay of the agents’
social preferences in case of two-sided rivalry, suppose that the agents are equal apart
from their social preferences. The weighting factor [(1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB ]
1+kB+kB lB
takes its hig-
hest value when kA is preferably large while kB at the same time is small. Analogously
[(1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB ]
1+kA+kAlA
is the highest when, when kB is large and kA is small. If kA and
kB increase at the same rate for lA = lB = 1, the values of
[(1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB ]
1+kB+kB lB
and
[(1+kA)(1+kB)−kAlAkB lB ]
1+kA+kAlA
remain unchanged. Therefore firm profits take their maximum if
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the difference between kA and kB is possibly large. If additionally
p2A1p
2
A2 + rAσ2(p
2
A1cA2σ2 − p2A2cA1σ1%)
P
+
p2A1p
2
A2 + rAσ1(p
2
A2cA1σ1 − p2A1cA2σ2%)
P
(65)
and
p2B1p
2
B2 + rBσ2(p
2
B1cB2σ2 − p2B2cB1σ1%)
Q
+
p2B1p
2
B2 + rBσ1(p
2
B2cB1σ1 − p2B1cB2σ2%)
Q
(66)
differ, the principal wants the agent to exhibit rivalry, whose contribution to his goal
function value would be larger in the situation of purely egoistical behavior.
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Notes
1 For contributions regarding the weighting and the combination of performance measures in case
of purely egoistical behavior see Spremann (1987), pp. 22–26, Banker/Datar (1989), Feltham/Xie
(1994), Datar/Kulp/Lambert (2001) as well as Christensen/Feltham (2005), especially p. 573 et sqq.
2 The problem of effort reduction because of asymmetrically distributed information and conflicting
objectives is referred to as moral hazard in agency theory. See Mirrlees (1976), Mirrlees (1999),
Jensen/Meckling (1976), Holmstro¨m (1979) and Grossman/Hart (1983).
3 See Holmstro¨m (1982), pp. 334–338. For the underlying information criterion see Holmstro¨m (1979).
4 For previous agency studies addressing the conflict between cooperation and competition see Itoh
(1992), Ramakrishnan/Thakor (1991), Choi (1993) and Macho-Stadler/Pe´rez-Castrillo (1993).
5 See Fehr/Schmidt (2003), Fehr/Falk (2002), Fehr/Fischbacher (2002) and Camerer (2003), pp. 43–
113.
6 See Fehr/Fischbacher/Kosfeld (2005).
7 The non-anonymity of players as well as the opportunity to reward and punish among themselves
is of crucial importance in this context. See Gintis (2000), p. 240 et seq.
8 By contrast, social preferences are only of minor importance on anonymous markets, where all
relevant information can be contractually fixed (e.g. auction and oligopoly markets). See Gintis
(2000), pp. 239–241 and Fehr/Schmidt (2003), pp. 242–244.
9 Rivalry comprises the combination of envy and spite.
10 See Englmaier/Wambach (2005), Itoh (2004), Dur/Glazer (2008), Mayer/Pfeiffer (2004) and Mayer
(2006).
11 See Fehr/Schmidt (1999).
12 See Holmstro¨m (1979) and Holmstro¨m (1982).
13 Bartling/von Siemens (2006) similarly reveal a tendency towards flat-wage contracts when agents are
envious. They further provide formal arguments for this form of remuneration to be more widespread
in firms than in markets.
14 Further studies, that are more distantly related to our subject are Demougin/Fluet (2003),
Grund/Sliwka (2005) and Demougin/Fluet/Helm (2006).
15 See Spremann (1987) and Holmstro¨m/Milgrom (1987).
16 For the importance of monetary performance measures see Vancil (1979), pp. 82–85.
17 Positive values of % seem to be of higher importance in practical applications, since several decentra-
lized units within the same firm are usually exposed to exogenous shocks following similar patterns
like the general business cycle, for example.
18 The optimality of linear incentive contracts is controversial in the literature. For theoretical foun-
dations see Holmstro¨m/Milgrom (1987), Ewert/Wagenhofer (1993) and Pfingsten (1995). A critical
assessment of the LEN-assumptions is given in Hemmer (2004).
19 An additional characteristic of the employed specification is, that higher values of lA and lB enhance
the impact of the social preference through the multiplicative combination with kA and kB . Thereby
the model represents, that particularly ambitious persons with a high aspiration level tend to behave
more competitively than people with a comparatively low aspiration level.
20 For purely egoistical behavior, the decision problem can be separated in one for agent A and one
for agent B. When % = 0 an analogous separation in the two performance measures x1 and x2 is
feasible.
21 See for example Holmstro¨m (1982) as well as Itoh (1992).
22 We return to the question under which circumstances the principal benefits from his agents’ social
preferences in section 6.
23 Compared to the other three-dimensional graphics, this figure is turned by 180◦ for perspective
reasons. The scaling of the x- and y-axis are consequently decreasing.
24 The index of kA is suppressed in the diagram. The underlying parameter constellation for the graphic
is pA1 = pA2 = pB1 = pB2 = cA1 = cB2 = rA = rB = σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1 , cB1 = cA2 = 6 , lA = 4.
25 The parameter constellation like in figure 1 is pA1 = pA2 = pB1 = pB2 = cA1 = cB2 = rA = rB =
σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1 , cB1 = cA2 = 6 , lA = 4. The index of kA again is suppressed.
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26 See Sandner (2008), pp. 60–62.
27 See Pedell (2000), p. 107 et sqq. for the depiction of a firm’s value creation network with the various
vertical as well as horizontal interdependencies.
28 See Choi (1993).
29 For the interaction of the different effects with interpretations see Choi (1993).
30 For a more detailed analysis of this situation see Sandner (2008), pp. 55–59.
31 For extreme parameter constellations it is theoretically even possible that both of an agents’ piece
rates switch signs.
32 A similar result was already achieved earlier for the case of inequity aversion. See Itoh (2004), pp.
36–37 and Bartling/von Siemens (2005), pp. 10–11.
33 See Sandner (2008), pp. 45–66.
34 For a corresponding conjecture see Itoh (2004), p. 42.
35 This is the case for the agent, who is endowed with higher productivity, lower effort costs as well as
smaller risk aversion and has the responsibility for the less volatile division result.
36 It has to be stated that agent A can even have an incentive to lessen agent B’s division result,
although he positively takes part in it through his wage compensation system. The reason is, that A
also accounts for the consequences of his actions on B’s remuneration when choosing efforts. Positive
effects not only enhance own remuneration but also heighten B’s reward at the same time. Thus, A
may be willing to forgo own remuneration in order to avoid an increase in B’s wage compensation
or in order to achieve a decline in his rewards. The trade-off established through the principal’s
incentive system causes, that in case of rivalry sabotage exactly occurs under circumstances where
it would have also occurred under purely egoistical behavior.
37 In the subsequent explanations we imply, that the agents only differ in the strength of their social
preferences. If not explicitly stated otherwise, we further assume lA = lB = 1.
38 This case is not part of our study. For examinations see Kandori (2003) as well as Bartling/von
Siemens (2004). As is well-known, in the presence of social preferences multiple equilibria can arise in
a public goods game. While Kandori (2003) explicitly includes the possibility of multiple equilibria
in his model and focuses on the analysis of their stability, Bartling/von Siemens (2004) ex ante
exclude such constellations by the construction of their model.
39 Sandner (2008), p. 135 et sqq. studies the impacts of altruism on the weighting and the combination of
performance measures. However, in doing so he only considers the case of technological independence.
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Summary
This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance eva-
luation and in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence of
technological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rivalry.
We find that the principal reacts to his agents’ competitive preferences through a real-
location of incentive intensity. As a consequence, depending on the underlying sort of
technological interdependency, various differences in the balancing of performance mea-
sures compared to the case of purely egoistical behavior arise and changes in the agents’
basic types of compensation can occur. We further show that the principal does not want
both of his agents to behave equally competitively. Instead, he can only profit when the
agents are asymmetrical. Then the principal wants the more productive agent to exhibit
rivalry while the other ideally should behave completely egoistically.
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag analysiert die Fragestellung, wie Performancemaße bei Bestehen tech-
nologischer Abha¨ngigkeiten zu gewichten und verknu¨pfen sind, wenn sich hierarchisch
gleichgestellte Agenten untereinander rivalistisch verhalten. Das Ergebnis ist, dass der
Prinzipal auf das Wettbewerbsdenken seiner Agenten durch eine Umverteilung in ihren
Anreizintensita¨ten reagiert. Verglichen mit der Situation rein egoistischen Verhaltens, er-
gibt sich daraus ein vera¨nderter Ausgleich in der Gewichtung von Performancemaßen.
Als Folge sind Wechsel in den jeweils anzuwendenden Entlohnungsarten mo¨glich, wobei
die Auswirkungen von der Art der zugrunde gelegten Produktionstechnologie abha¨ngig
sind. Wir zeigen weiterhin, dass der Prinzipal keinen Nutzen daraus zieht, wenn sich beide
Agenten gleichermaßen rivalistisch verhalten. Er kann nur dann profitieren, wenn sie sich
in ihren (sozialen) Pra¨ferenzen unterscheiden. In diesem Fall ist es aus seiner Sicht wu¨n-
schenswert, dass sich der produktivere Agent mo¨glichst rivalistisch, der andere hingegen
vollsta¨ndig eigennu¨tzig verha¨lt.
